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I. Introduction 
 
Smart contracts are computer-programmed series of permissions and 
automated events. Sometimes referred to as “unstoppable 
applications,”1 they perform tasks automatically upon the occurrence 
of pre-determined triggers, without the intervention of trusted 
intermediaries such as lawyers, courts, or other legal institutions. They 
are ‘smart’ only in the way that artificial intelligence is smart—that is, 
they respond to stimuli coded into them by their programmers (so 
garbage in, garbage out). They might at some point be ‘smarter’ in 
machine learning terms, depending on the desirability of enabling 
machine-learned determinations to trigger predetermined 
consequences. The ability to carry out the terms of an agreement 
without facilitation by third parties makes smart contracts attractive to 
some in the private sector, seemingly streamlining functions that might 
otherwise be disrupted by disputes, mistakes, or mundane 
administrative matters such as information validation.  
 
While the private sector enthuses over smart contracts, the response of 
regulators seems more guarded. Regulators might be wary to the 
extent that smart contracts can be used to bypass existing legal regimes 
by facilitating unconventional transactions. For tax authorities in 
particular, a rise in unconventional transactions, especially when 
accomplished via virtual processes that have no single owner or 
responsible party, disrupts a key mechanism for income taxation, 
namely, the use of third parties as tax collectors for specified 
transactions via reporting and withholding obligations. When the 
payor of potentially taxable income is foreign, virtual, unknown, or 
any combination thereof, and when the possible range of transactions 
do not fit familiar conventions, it is much harder to impose these 
obligations.2 
 
 
 
 
1 See Arjuna Sky Kok, Write A Simple Contract On Top Of Ethereum, MEDIUM (May 2, 2018), 
https://medium.com/coinmonks/write-a-simple-contract-on-top-of-ethereum-92b543594e84 
[https://perma.cc/BWZ2-6PJE]. 
2 In terms of reporting and withholding, the same problems arise in the cash economy, which 
is responsible for a significant amount of noncompliance with tax laws around the world. But 
in terms of the identification of reportable transactions, there may be base defining issues. The 
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The problem multiplies when the transfers are of solely virtual assets, 
one or more parties to the transaction is unknown, and the transaction 
platform is ‘located’ beyond the practical reach of the regulatory 
authority, even if legally within scope. The problem seems 
insurmountable if we imagine that smart contracts may one day be 
enabled to make decisions using machine-learning to transfer assets, 
rights, or other, yet to be defined things, with or without the active 
knowledge or action of the parties. 
 
On the other hand, regulators might see smart contracts as an 
opportunity to increase compliance with law to the extent a 
government can either insert itself as a party to otherwise private 
agreements or design its own smart contract system to impose upon 
the populace.3 For example, if a government can (in practical terms) 
write itself into a smart contract as an automatic payee upon the 
execution of a given transfer—or even to search out transfers and pay 
itself—the decentralized nature of the transaction, the anonymous 
nature of the transactors, the virtual nature of the assets, and even the 
knowledge of the beneficiaries—all are potentially irrelevant to the 
enforcement of a tax claim.4  
 
Whether a particular government can effectively force its way into 
private agreements in order to exact a share in tax depends on its 
practical ability to enforce its will upon at least one of the transactors, 
 
OECD’s work on the digitalization of the economy captures some of the difficulty of base 
definition that could potentially be involved. See OECD, PROGRAMME OF WORK TO DEVELOP A 
CONSENSUS SOLUTION TO THE TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM THE DIGITALISATION OF THE 
ECONOMY, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS, (2019), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
beps/programme-of-work-to-develop-a-consensus-solution-to-the-tax-challenges-arising-
from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy.pdf. 
3 The idea would be to replicate government involvement in traditional contracts, which may 
be facilitated by systems such as transfer registration (such as apply in the case of real 
property transfers) or withholding taxes (such as apply in the case of sales, excise, transfer, 
and other taxes). 
4 For an optimistic view, see Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew Shact, Blockchain (Distributed 
Ledger Technology) Solves VAT Fraud, (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working 
Paper No. 16-41 2016), https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2016/10/BLOCKCHAIN-3.pdf; Richard 
T. Ainsworth, Musaad Alwohaibi & Mike Cheetham, VATCoin: The GCC’s 
Cryptotaxcurrency 1 (Bos. Univ. Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 17-04, 2016), 
https://www.bu.edu/law/files/2017/03/GCC-VATCoin.pdf (proposing that states use smart 
contracts in VAT systems by integrating a token system with fiat currency). 
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the smart contract, or the platform upon which the contract is stored.5 
Assuming they are workable on a large scale at some time in the 
future, it is probably impossible to know whether smart contracts are 
ultimately more likely to burden or empower the state in its effort to 
tax.  
 
This essay nevertheless explores the terrain in an effort to lay out the 
main factors at play. The discussion begins by providing a very brief 
explanation of the technical background, defining smart contracts, 
exploring some of their currently envisioned uses, and introducing the 
Ethereum-based CryptoKitties application as a base case to interrogate 
some of the challenges involved. The essay then explores why and 
how tax authorities might choose to fight the encroachment of smart 
contracts via rule adaptation, to benefit from smart contract innovation 
by intervening as a party in private smart contracts, or to attempt to 
corner the market by deploying their own smart contract technology in 
competition with private developers (or engage in some combination 
of these approaches), in each case returning to the CryptoKitty 
ecosystem as a concrete example. The discussion concludes with some 
predictions about how tax authorities are likely to respond to and 
interact with smart contracts. 
 
II. Background 
 
Smart contracts have been described as neither smart nor contracts, so 
some explanation is in order.6 The concept was introduced in 1994 by 
 
 
 
 
5 For example, a government might claim in rem jurisdiction over a smart contract, but it is not 
clear how practical enforcement of such a claim could be executed except by having some 
kind of physical control over one of the parties to the transaction or in some cases, perhaps the 
platform developers. This is explored in more detail below. 
6 See, e.g., Mark Giancaspro, Is a ‘Smart Contract’ Really a Smart Idea? Insights From a 
Legal Perspective, 33 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 825, 828 (2017) (stating that contract 
law will have to adapt to regulate and enforce smart contracts); Stewart Macaulay, Non-
contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) 
(explaining relational contracting); Max Raskin, The Law and Legality of Smart Contracts, 1 
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 305, 305 (2017) (stating that smart contracts should be viewed as no more 
than a “form of more traditional agreements”); Philippa Ryan, Smart Contract Relations in e-
Commerce: Legal Implications of Exchanges Conducted on the Blockchain, 7 TECH. 
INNOVATION MGMT. REV. 14 (2017) (noting that smart contracting’s trust protocol can be 
understood as a form of non-contractual social exchange conducted without dispute and 
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computer scientist Nick Szabo, who defined a smart contract as a 
“computerized transaction protocol that executes the terms of a 
contract.”7 The idea is to effectuate specified terms by having a 
computer program (rather than a person) automatically perform pre-
determined future functions at the occurrence of predetermined future 
stimuli.8 
 
 
resolved without recourse to the courts, which empirical legal scholars note is often the case 
with contractual affairs in any case); Alexander Savelyev, Contract law 2.0: ‘Smart’ Contracts 
as the Beginning of the End of Classic Contract Law, 26 INFO. & COMM. TECH. LAW 128, 128-
30 (2017) (noting that smart contracts do not create obligations in the legal sense of the term). 
7 Nick Szabo, Smart Contracts, (1994) (unpublished manuscript) http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl 
/rob/Courses/InformationInSpeech/CDROM/Literature/LOTwinterschool2006/szabo.best.vwh
.net/smart.contracts.html). This definition has largely carried through to contemporary 
discourse. See, e.g., SMART CONTRACTS ALL., CHAMBER OF DIG. COMMERCE, SMART 
CONTRACTS: IS THE LAW READY? 10 (2018), https://lowellmilkeninstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/08/Smart-Contracts-Whitepaper.pdf (defining smart contracts in the 
context of blockchain technology as “computer code that, upon the occurrence of a specified 
condition or conditions, is capable of running automatically according to prespecified 
functions. The code can be stored and processed on a distributed ledger and would write any 
resulting change into the distributed ledger.”). 
8 Smart contracts are agreements written in computer code that use a typically decentralized 
distributed ledger, that is, a blockchain, to execute pre-determined commands to carry out 
specified functions. See Nick Szabo, Formalizing and Securing Relationships on Public 
Networks, 9 FIRST MONDAY 2 (1997), http://ojphi.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article /view/548/469 
(explaining how to write computer software-based ‘contractual clauses’ that prevent parties 
from terminating their performance obligations); see also VITALIK BUTERIN, A NEXT-
GENERATION SMART CONTRACT AND DECENTRALIZED APPLICATION PLATFORM 1 (2014) 
(describing smart contracts as “systems which automatically move digital assets according to 
arbitrary pre-specified rules”); PRIMAVERA DE FILIPPI & AARON WRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND 
THE LAW: THE RULE OF CODE 73 (Harvard University Press, 2018) (describing Szabo’s work as 
the first to apply cryptographic protocols to execute digital contracts); Karen E. C. Levy, 
Book-Smart, Not Street-Smart: Blockchain-Based Smart Contracts and The Social Workings 
of Law, 3 ENGAGING SCI. TECH. & SOC. 1, 1 (2017) (“Smart contracts are agreements that 
utilize the blockchain––a digital ledger, distributed across a network, that securely records 
transactions between parties––to automatically and securely execute obligations when certain 
conditions are met...”). Because this essay focuses on how states might view smart contracts as 
both challenge and opportunity from a tax perspective, the many reasons why smart contracts 
are not contracts are beyond the scope of the present discussion. However, these issues are 
addressed at length in a growing body of scholarship that is skeptical of the usefulness and 
viability of the technology. See, e.g., DAVID GERARD, ATTACK OF THE 50 FOOT BLOCKCHAIN: 
BITCOIN, BLOCKCHAIN, ETHEREUM, & SMART CONTRACTS 101 (explaining that “[c]omputer 
code maps very badly to real-world legal agreements, where the hard part is not normal 
operations, but what to do when things go wrong; immutability means you can’t fix problems, 
programmers need to write perfect bug-free programs first time every time, and the contract 
can’t be updated if circumstances or laws change; if the contract acts on real-world data, that 
data will often need human interpretation.”). 
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Ethereum founder Vitalik Buterin provided by way of example that 
“one might have a treasury contract of the form ‘A can withdraw up to 
X currency units per day, B can withdraw up to Y per day, A and B 
together can withdraw anything, and A can shut off B’s ability to 
withdraw.’”9 Buterin’s example pertains to using smart contracts to 
issue cryptocurrencies to investors, such as was done in the use of 
Etherparty’s Rocket 2.0 to raise funds in an initial coin offering.10 
Smart contract proponents envision their widespread use for more 
conventional phenomena, such as the payment of a royalty to a 
musician upon every listen or download of a song from a streaming or 
retail platform.11 But perhaps one of the most popularized uses of 
smart contracts is in the context of the trading and breeding of 
CryptoKitties. 
 
CryptoKitties are digital assets traded on the Ethereum network, with 
the unique property of allowing propagation through digital breeding 
into new, unique digital assets.12 CryptoKitties are a type of smart 
contract because each individual CryptoKitty is a digital asset with a 
code that emulates breeding by combining and manipulating data to 
generate new and unique data—the owner of two CryptoKitties can 
 
 
 
 
9 See Buterin, supra note 8, at 1. Buterin further noted that “the logical extension of this is 
decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs)—long-term smart contracts that contain the 
assets and encode the bylaws of an entire organization.” Id. 
10 See ETHERPARTY: PRODUCTS, https://ico.etherparty.com/products. 
11 Imogen Heap is credited as the first musician to attempt to release music via a blockchain-
based smart contract. See George Howard, Imogen Heap’s Mycelia: An Artists’ Approach for 
a Fair Trade Music Business, Inspired by Blockchain, FORBES (July 17, 2015), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/georgehoward/2015/07/17/imogen-heaps-mycelia-an-artists-
approach-for-a-fair-trade-music-business-inspired-by-blockchain/#30766f814969 
[https://perma.cc/7TKS-Q2CB]; Imogen Heap, Smart Contracts for the Music Industry, 
MEDIUM (Mar. 15, 2018), https://medium.com/humanizing-the-singularity/smart-contracts-for-
the-music-industry-3e641f87cc7 [https://perma.cc/P47X-HNVV]. The venture was considered 
a complete failure, mostly due to the complexity involved in tying downloads to the Ethereum 
platform. See, e.g., GERARD, supra note 8, (“The next evolution of smart contracts for music 
distribution seeks to simplify and streamline access and download beyond cryptographic 
protocols.”); SOUNDAC, https://soundac.io [https://perma.cc/9BV8-KCU9] (describing its 
platform as “an ownerless, automated, globally distributed, Peer-to-Peer network” for 
musicians, music streaming service providers, and music retailers).  
12 See CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co [https://perma.cc/2HKT-GJJ8] 
(describing itself as “a game centered around breedable, collectible, and oh-so-adorable 
creatures we call CryptoKitties! Each cat is one-of-a-kind and 100% owned by you; it cannot 
be replicated, taken away, or destroyed.”) . 
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choose to breed them, but the resulting offspring is a product of 
automated computer code that produces unpredictable and unique 
results.13 Newly generated CryptoKitties may be worth more or less 
than their parents, with prices for individual CryptoKitties rising to as 
high as US$170,000.14 
 
CryptoKitties are built on the Ethereum network, which largely 
popularized the smart contract phenomenon, but smart contracts might 
also be executed via NEO,15 Chainlink,16 EOS,17 Stratis,18 or multiple 
other networks.19 In Ethereum and other networks, the term has been 
defined broadly to mean any program that runs on the blockchain 
(whether or not it actually executes any contractual terms). Ethereum’s 
website currently provides samples of possible agreements that could 
be written as smart contracts, including a will, insurance policy, voting 
registry, sales contract or marriage contract.20 
 
Much of the excitement—and the skepticism—around smart contracts 
relates to their potential to overcome the limitations of traditional 
law.21 Continued enthusiasm means that proliferation is likely even 
though experience to date shows there is ample reason for caution.22  
 
 
 
 
13 See Getting Started, CRYPTOKITTIES, https://guide.cryptokitties.co/guide/getting-
started?_ga=2.186416622.671533876.1568573125-1637773996.1568573125 
[https://perma.cc/5RA9-MSJ8]; see also Technical details, CRYPTOKITTIES, 
https://www.cryptokitties.co/technical-details [https://perma.cc/H3VM-BUBG] (explaining 
that “the smart contracts have over 4-billion variations of phenotypes (what you see) and 
genotypes (what you don’t see)”) . 
14 CryptoKitties sales are tracked by a number of sites, for example CRYPTOKITTIES SALES, 
https://kittysales.herokuapp.com [https://perma.cc/U3QW-9LYW]. 
15 NEO is referred to colloquially as the Chinese Ethereum owing to its similarity. See NEO, 
https://neo.org. 
16 CHAINLINK, https://chain.link [https://perma.cc/3D2T-BGRJ] (“Your smart contracts 
connected to real world data, events and payments. The Chainlink network provides reliable 
tamper-proof inputs and outputs for complex smart contracts on any blockchain.”) . 
17 EOS, https://eos.io [https://perma.cc/QE4C-GXW6] (“The most powerful infrastructure for 
decentralized applications”) . 
18 Stratis is aimed at corporate use of blockchain processes and offers “blockchain as a 
service.” STRATIS, https://stratisplatform.com [https://perma.cc/6EYP-AHNH]. 
19 E.g., Buterin, supra note 8, at 1.  
20 ETHERSCRIPTER, http://etherscripter.com/0-5-1/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2019) (the possible 
agreement is chosen from the “Samples” drop down on the top bar). 
21 This is characteristic of blockchain development. See e.g. Raskin, supra note 6, at 308 
(smart contract enthusiasts believe that increasing the possibility of private enforcement of 
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This presents a dilemma for tax authorities. On the one hand, the tax 
law cannot ignore emerging technology when it has real impacts on 
investors and consumers, as smart contracts have already had. 
Wherever economically impactful transactions occur, the tax system is 
implicated whether regulators realize it and can manage it or not. 
There are potentially significant tax implications even if, in the most 
skeptical view, smart contracts are viewed by some as little more than 
high-tech Ponzi schemes that are likely to become increasingly 
irresponsible in tandem with the increasing skills of programmers to 
algorithmically empower them. These tax consequences might seem 
mundane in comparison to the excitement of the developing 
technology, perhaps, but they could prove vital to the continued 
functioning of the state as guardian of a minimally rational economic 
order.  
 
On the other hand, if smart contracts do begin to take hold and become 
significant facilitators and governors of transactions, tax authorities 
might want to take a more proactive role than simply applying existing 
legal standards to new fact patterns. In considering its approach, tax 
authorities seem to have three possible approaches available to them, 
none of which are mutually exclusive: the tax authority might (1) fight 
the technology with familiar weapons, trying to overcome the 
obstacles to enforcement one at a time; (2) join the market, finding a 
way to benefit from the technology by forcibly inserting itself into 
private contract ordering; or (3) compete with the private sector to 
corner the market, by creating a rival platform to facilitate digital 
 
contracts will reduce both “the need and extent of monopolized police and legal services 
provided by the state”); What is Ethereum?, ETHERSCIPTOR, https://etherscripter.com/what 
_is_ethereum.html [https://perma.cc/3SLJ-G6BK] (claiming that “Ethereum is a new kind of 
law” that allows unbreakable contracts which can be “perfectly observed and enforced,” doing 
away with problematic ambiguity, expensive enforcement, and the need for government 
regulation).  
22 Perhaps the most well-known catastrophe relating to the unstoppable nature of smart 
contracts is the Ethereum DAO, a public investment fund hosted on the Ethereum blockchain, 
the coded flaws of which ultimately led to a fork in the Ether cryptocurrency. See Morgan E. 
Peck, DAO May Be Dead After $60 Million Theft, IEEE SPECTRUM (June 17, 2016, 10:00 
PM), https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/computing/networks/dao-may-be-dead-after-
40million-theft [https://perma.cc/T5UM-MRE4].  
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transactions according to its own terms. Each of these are discussed in 
turn. 
 
III. Fight with Familiar Weapons 
 
Probably the first response of the tax authority to any new technology 
is to, in effect, deny it any revolutionary quality and try to supplement 
the existing rules with familiar safeguards to allow taxation despite the 
newly identified obstacle.23 The global response to the rise of the so-
called ‘digitalized economy’ is illustrative of this approach, and 
provides a template for how tax authorities are likely to deal with 
smart contracts. 
 
After announcing that tackling issues arising from the digital economy 
would be a major plank in its international initiative to counter base 
erosion and profit shifting (BEPS), in 2015 the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) released an “Action 
1 Report” that admitted to a lack of consensus on defining the digital 
economy, much less developing a coherent and mutually advantageous 
approach to taxing it.24 Conceding that the digital economy is 
indistinct from the rest of the economy and could not be meaningfully 
distinguished for purposes of developing ring-fenced protective tax 
measures, the Action 1 Report outlined three options to tweak existing 
rule sets to act as safeguards against base erosion associated with 
emerging technologies, namely an expansion of nexus, a new 
withholding tax, and a new equalization levy.25  
 
 
 
 
23 This would be consistent with the approach of many governments to smart contracts in 
general, except where they involve the sale of assets governed by securities regulations, such 
as in the case of initial token offerings. See, e.g., Pulat Yunusov, The Law of Smart Contracts, 
in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS IN BLOCKCHAIN LAW 151 (Aaron Grinhaus ed. 
2019) (stating that “regulators appear to apply the law to smart contracts and their applications 
by analogy to conventional concepts,” first because “the legal tradition is conservative and it 
tends to try to fit new facts to existing rules by analogy where possible,” and second because 
“smart contracts by their nature are one of the most regulation-proof technologies in history 
due to the decentralized nature of block chains. Without declaring war on smart contracts, the 
legal system can usually deal with them only by affecting people and property before they are 
committed to a smart contract or after the smart contract has finished executing”). 
24 OECD, ADDRESSING THE TAX CHALLENGES OF THE DIGITAL ECONOMY: ACTION 1--2015 
FINAL REPORT (2015). 
25 Id. 
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Later, the OECD released an “Interim Report” on the topic, revealing 
its findings to date and opening up a public consultation period.26 The 
discussion of possible blockchain applications is fairly light in the 
Interim Report, with most of the attention focused on private 
cryptocurrency use.27  
 
The OECD suggests that more consultation is needed, but suggests as 
possible regulatory solutions “legislative measures which require 
digital asset exchange platforms or other third parties to report and/or 
which allow tax administrations to request information on transactions 
regarding digital assets….”28 This is a prime example of fighting with 
familiar weapons: most scholars view third party reporting and 
withholding as crucial to effective income taxation, and it is a common 
strategy to counter a broad range of income tax compliance issues.29 
The OECD’s proposed strategy to an identified menace is accordingly 
to apply these familiar enforcement mechanisms to the new challenge, 
as opposed to seeing the new challenge as essentially immune to the 
paradigmatic approach.  
In the case of smart contracts, however, extending the paradigmatic 
approach poses some difficult challenges. This is partly because while 
smart contracts can bypass jurisdictional boundaries, the members of 
the OECD cannot. The public international law quality of territorial 
 
 
 
 
26 OECD, TAX CHALLENGES ARISING FROM DIGITALISATION INTERIM REPORT (2018). 
27 Id. at 206-208. 
28 Id. at 208. 
29 See Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement, 2020 
B.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 2, 52), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3325598 
(explaining that “government needs information about taxpayers’ transactions in order to 
determine whether their reporting is honest” and that third-party reporting helps the 
government obtain that information); Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to 
Cheat? Evidence From a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 653 
(2011) (finding low levels of tax evasion occur when taxpayers “are unable to cheat 
successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Mark D. Phillips, Individual 
Income Tax Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show?, 67 NAT’L 
TAX J. 531, 563 (2014) (finding that compliance with income tax law depends on matching 
income via third party reporting); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax 
Evasion, 21 J. Econ. Persp. 25, 37 (2007) (correlating “the rate of compliance and the presence 
of enforcement mechanisms such as information reports and employer withholding.”). But see 
Wei Cui, Taxation Without Information: The Institutional Foundations of Modern Tax 
Collection, 20 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 93, 146 (2018). 
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jurisdiction has always effectively prevented enforcement of tax across 
borders without express cooperation. These jurisdictional boundary 
problems are rarely discussed explicitly in OECD documents, but they 
are an underlying force in all discussions involving international tax 
enforcement problems.30  
 
But smart contracts’ immunity to the paradigm is also likely because 
anything built upon distributed ledger technology lacks the one thing 
that makes taxation feasible—namely, a responsible party that can be 
pressed into service as the tax collector, even if not the ultimate 
taxpayer.31 The OECD’s Interim Report is simply silent on how to 
request information or require anything else of a party when, as in the 
case of a decentralized ledger, there is no one single person upon 
which to impose such a regulatory requirement.32  
Unfortunately, also lacking is an identifiable group of possible 
responsible parties, any one of which could be designated the tax 
 
 
 
 
30 See generally Allison Christians, Sovereignty, Taxation, and Social Contract, 18 MINN. J. 
INT’L L. 99 (2009) (discussing the OECD’s brief deliberation over the possibility of imposing 
sanctions on countries that refused to voluntarily cooperate with its standards for acceptable 
forms of tax competition, in the context of its work to curtail what it characterized as “harmful 
tax practices”). 
31 See, e.g., Manoj Viswanathan, Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy, 34 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 283 (2018) (explaining that tax compliance depends on information from centralized 
financial intermediaries such as brokers and employers, which can be circumvented by some 
digital economy platforms, for example in the case of some futures and derivatives contracts 
which escape registered exchanges as an intermediary, resulting in underreporting and 
presumably under-taxation of the proceeds of transactions); Clement Okello Migai, Julia de 
Jong & Jeffrey P. Owens, The Sharing Economy: Turning Challenges Into Compliance 
Opportunities for Tax Administrations, 16 EJOURNAL TAX RES. 395, 420-421 (2019) (noting 
that the proliferation of payments and transactions without third parties may lead to many 
services being provided in an opaque fashion, and explaining that the challenge for tax 
administrators is to design a system “that allows taxation of the growing economic sector” 
without incentivizing the rise of the informal or unregulated economy); see also Yunusov, 
supra note 23, at 147 (“[T]he fundamental reality of smart contracts and blockchains is that 
governments can regulate them only if one or more people have control over the smart 
contract or the block chain and the governments have physical jurisdiction over these people 
or their property.”). 
32 See, e.g., Justin Cole, Blockchain Business Structuring: Offshore Foundations and 
International Business Companies, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS IN 
BLOCKCHAIN LAW 46 (Aaron Grinhaus ed. 2019) (“[T]he software development [of 
decentralized ledger technology] is distributed worldwide rather than in a single office in one 
country. Therefore, the argument as to where the code was written and where the subsequent 
profits should be recognized becomes more difficult to answer.”). 
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matters party (as, for example, might be done to assign tax filing 
responsibility in the case of a limited partnership or limited liability 
company).33 Smart contracts may be developed in any jurisdiction, 
with software written anywhere, running on blockchains maintained 
by hundreds or thousands of once and future miners located all over 
the globe. It is hard to imagine how imposing reporting and 
withholding requirements is going to work.  
 
Consider the example of CryptoKitties introduced above. 
CryptoKitties are traded in ETH using a third party platform called 
Dapper.34 Therefore, to buy CryptoKitties requires acquiring ETH (for 
example with fiat currency or another cryptocurrency), creating a 
Dapper account, creating a CryptoKitty account that links to the 
Dapper account, and then purchasing the CryptoKitties; breeding costs 
an additional fee in ETH.35 ETH can be purchased through a number 
of exchanges; Dapper allows purchase via credit card, such as via 
Simplex, a licensed financial institution.36 
 
In terms of any one government identifying a third party information 
reporting and tax withholding agent, the CryptoKitty universe appears 
to provide an abundance of options, yet it is possible that none has all 
of the information needed by a particular tax authority. Simplex in 
particular seems capable of providing useful information since it is a 
financial institution that collects tax relevant information when 
facilitating fiat-crypto currency transactions.37 However, the 
information Simplex gathers is in the context of an exchange of fiat 
currency into one or more cryptocurrencies, and the transfer of such 
 
 
 
 
33 I.R.C. § 301.6231(a)(7)-1 (2001). 
34 DAPPER, https://www.meetdapper.com [https://perma.cc/X8RK-YSBV].  
35 The fee varies but is typically 0.008 ETH, or about US$1.51 at the time of this publication.  
36 As such, Simplex adheres to AML/CFT standards and requires government identification to 
process purchases of cryptocurrency using conventional credit cards. About Us: What We’re 
Doing, SIMPLEX, https://www.simplex.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/8HLH-HLFK] (“Simplex 
is a licensed financial institution that provides an online fraud-free payment processing 
solution.”).  
37 The expansion of international coordination on financial regulation will expand information 
gathering and reporting obligations going forward, but it is expected that peer-to-peer 
transactions will continue to escape regulation. See, e.g., Michael J. Casey, The Cat and 
Mouse Game of Crypto Regulation Enters a New Phase, COINDESK (May 27, 2019, 8:00 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/the-cat-and-mouse-game-of-crypto-regulation-enters-a-new-phase. 
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cryptocurrencies to a Dapper wallet. Purchasing cryptocurrency with 
fiat currency is not a taxable event; it is the subsequent exchange that 
potentially gives rise to taxation. 
 
In turn, Dapper might be able to provide some tax information about 
the exchange of cryptocurrencies by CryptoKitty buyers and sellers. 
To do so effectively, however, Dapper would have to track the cost 
base,38 holding period, and sale prices earned by all CryptoKitty users 
(which is potentially feasible), as well as the tax residence of all users 
at all relevant times. This was not likely feasible before June of 2019, 
because tax residence is not necessarily information that Dapper would 
have possessed.39 However, the recent adoption of expanded 
information exchange among virtual asset dealers in respect of 
transactions between them may alter this result going forward.40  
 
 
 
 
38 This presumably includes the dollar value of the ETH-based purchase price plus the 
transaction fee (gas) paid to miners to complete purchase, in the case of existing CryptoKitties, 
or transaction and “birthing” fees, in the case of newly created CryptoKitties. See FAQs, 
CRYPTOKITTIES, https://www.cryptokitties.co/faq#how-much-does-it-cost-to-play-
cryptokitties (last visited Nov. 19, 2019); see also DENVER ACCOUNTING GRP., Taxation of 
CryptoKitties, DIG. CURRENCY ACCT. (Dec. 7, 2017), 
https://digitalcurrencyaccounting.com/2017/12/07/taxation-of-cryptokitties/ 
[https://perma.cc/5CKL-4JPX] (discussing U.S. tax treatment of CryptoKitty transactions) . 
39 Setting up a Dapper account requires providing a phone number, which could serve as a 
proxy for residence, or at least indicia of residence, as it is in the case of regulations respecting 
ownership of foreign bank accounts in U.S. law and in the Common Reporting Standard 
adopted by OECD countries. See, e.g., Understanding How The Common Reporting Standard 
(CRS) and Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA) Affect You – An FAQ, CANADIAN 
BANKERS ASS’N: BANKING BASICS (Dec. 21, 2017), https://cba.ca/understanding-the-common-
reporting-standard (explaining that under these standards, financial accounts are “subject to 
ongoing review for any changes in client information (such as address or phone number) that 
could indicate a change of tax residence”). Using a weak proxy for tax residence creates a 
relatively high likelihood of error including through manipulation by the taxpayer, but it may 
nevertheless increase voluntary compliance with relevant tax laws. 
40 See Fin. Action Task Force, Interpretive Note to Recommendation 15, in The FATF 
Recommendations 70, 71 (2019) (“Countries should ensure that originating [virtual asset 
service providers] obtain and hold required and accurate originator information and required 
beneficiary information on virtual asset transfers, submit the above information to beneficiary 
VASPs … and make it available on request to appropriate authorities.”); see also Fin. Action 
Task Force, Outcomes FATF Plenary, 16-21 June 2019, (June 21, 2019), FATF: 
PUBLICATIONS https://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/fatfgeneral/documents/outcomes-
plenary-june-2019.html (describing the new measures as necessary to “prevent the misuse of 
virtual assets for money laundering and terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation”). 
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It seems likely that as countries increase their regulation of virtual 
assets for purposes of money laundering and terrorist financing, the 
information that will be gathered and shared across countries will 
include tax relevant information. This makes the prospect of increased 
withholding and reporting obligations respecting smart contracts 
increasingly feasible, so long as transactions occur in regulated 
custodial wallets (as in the case of Simplex and Dapper).41 However, 
this assumes that significant information gaps that currently permeate 
virtual asset activities are surmountable.42 Even if this is possible, the 
imposition of detailed information reporting obligations for virtual 
asset service providers do not extend to peer-to-peer transactions 
involving unregulated entities or platforms, which are a large and 
growing segment of the virtual asset market.43 
 
IV. Join the Market 
 
 
 
 
 
41 This is debatable since crypto addresses lack the kind of precise information associated with 
traditional financial institutions. See, e.g., Letter from Glob. Dig. Fin., to the Fin. Action Task 
Force 4-5 (April 7, 2019), https://www.gdf.io/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/GDF-Input-to-the-
FATF-public-statement-of-22-Feb-2019-FINAL.pdf (noting that unlike a wire transfer, which 
includes the recipient’s bank location, branch information and account numbers, a crypto 
transaction requires only an address, which does not indicate a destination, is unregistered, and 
can be created at any time). 
42 See, e.g., Letter from Glob. Dig. Fin., supra note 41, at 5-6 (stating that among the 
significant issues for effective regulation is a series of information gaps in the virtual asset 
supply chain, notably “1. An originating VASP (where one is used) does not have knowledge 
of the beneficiary VASP nor the beneficiary details. 2. The virtual asset holder (i.e. the 
originator) does not even need to know the beneficiary name nor which VASP they use, if any. 
3. The originating VASP simply writes the transaction to the ledger for it to be validated as a 
legitimate transaction. There is no concept of notification to a beneficiary. 4. The beneficiary 
VASP (where one is used) receives the transaction by reading the ledger and reconciling a 
change on the ledger in relation to a virtual asset address it maintains. It does not receive any 
notification 5 or request from an originating VASP, nor does it know who the originating 
address belongs to. 5. Even if an originating VASP could collect beneficiary VASP and the 
ultimate beneficiary's details, there is no way to reliably validate that the details entered are 
accurate (i.e. if incorrect information is supplied by the originator, it would not prevent the 
transaction from being written to the ledger”). 
43 See, e.g., Casey, supra note 37; see also Marc Hochstein, Beyond KYC: Regulators Set to 
Adopt Tough New Rules for Crypto Exchanges, COINDESK, (May 20, 2019, 12:00 PM), 
https://www.coindesk.com/beyond-kyc-global-regulators-appear-set-to-adopt-tough-new-
rules-for-crypto-exchanges [https://perma.cc/T9GD-JK66]. 
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The second possible strategy of government would seem to be forcibly 
inserting itself into the private sector’s development of the emerging 
technology to achieve its enforcement goals.44 In this scenario, the tax 
authority would simply seek to become a named payee in as many 
smart contracts as possible, thus replicating the withholding 
mechanism in any automated contract execution. As in the case of the 
adaptation strategy described above, there are currently some exacting 
technical and jurisdictional barriers to this approach. A possible future 
in which machine learning algorithms help governments detect the 
creation of smart contracts on a platform-by-platform basis might 
potentially increase compliance opportunities.  
 
This could follow the platform-based compliance model for indirect 
taxes, mentioned in the OECD’s Action 1 Report as a possible 
safeguard measure. Currently there is a relatively short list of retail 
sales platforms in existence such that governments could potentially 
reap fairly large indirect (goods and services) tax compliance gains by 
forging cooperative tax withholding agreements with selected 
companies (for example, Amazon, AirBnB, Uber, and so on).45  
 
Similarly, even though there are more than a thousand 
cryptocurrencies in existence and more forming all the time, there are 
leading blockchain platforms and relatively dominant 
cryptocurrencies, most prominently bitcoin and, in relation to smart 
contracts, ether. Moreover, the pool of large scale miners of these 
dominant cryptocurrencies also seems to be fairly limited, potentially 
 
 
 
 
44 This would effectively override the wishes of some proponents of smart contracts. See, e.g., 
Raskin, supra note 6, at 307 (noting that the point of smart contracts is to “protect individual 
autonomy over state diktat”). 
45 This has been a strategy by the government of Quebec in respect of provincial goods and 
services taxes, for example. See THE CANADIAN PRESS, Airbnb Agrees to Pay Lodging Taxes 
in Quebec, MONTREAL GAZETTE, Aug. 29, 2017, https://montrealgazette.com/news/local-
news/airbnb-agrees-to-pay-lodging-taxes-in-quebec (“Airbnb’s Alex Dagg said the agreement 
underlines just how the company and a province can work in tandem. ‘As the first of its kind 
tax agreement in this country, this is a landmark announcement and a defining moment for 
Airbnb, not just in Quebec, but in all of Canada,’ Dagg, Airbnb’s public policy manager for 
Canada, told the news conference.”). Whether Quebec is making similar efforts with AirBnB 
competitors, such as academichomes.com, has not been made public. 
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providing viable targets of tax authority’s negotiated compliance 
efforts.46  
 
A likely point of entry beyond cryptocurrency miners or an elusive 
decentralized ledger itself is traditional financial institutions. Large 
retail banks and credit card companies also happen to be some of the 
world’s biggest investors in blockchain technology. For example, 
Wells Fargo, the Bank of America, the Bank of New York, and 
Mastercard have each filed dozens of patents for various blockchain-
based payment systems; in particular, Mastercard has filed patents for 
systems linking fiat currency accounts to digital assets.47 This makes 
them potential links in an enforcement chain. 
 
To the extent that so-called fiat currencies—the U.S. dollar, 
especially—continue to be stable and reliable compared to any 
cryptocurrency (as seems likely), the traditional financial 
intermediaries will continue to be a vital part of the overall economic 
landscape. Financial intermediaries, moreover, remain susceptible to 
national tax regulation.48 To the extent they are adapting to blockchain, 
these institutions may provide a vital link between tax authorities and 
 
 
 
 
46 The effective centralization of blockchain due to the monopolization of mining by large 
scale miners is a problem for blockchain’s anti-regulatory proponents but an opportunity for 
certain governments, as profitable large scale mining may only be possible in certain countries 
(i.e., where it is cold and the electricity is cheap, as in Quebec and Iceland). By one estimate, 
the current electricity cost to mine one bitcoin, valued at the time of this writing at US$3,977, 
is approximately US$3,965 in Canada, US$4,746 in Iceland, and US$4,758 in the United 
States. Cost of Mining a Bitcoin Worldwide, IMGUR (Jan. 16, 2018), 
https://imgur.com/a/ngs7m. Factoring in the cost of equipment and facilities, the profit margin 
on mining thus depends heavily on the current market price of the mined cryptocurrency. See, 
e.g., Andrew Geyl (OrganofCorti), November 6th 2016 Bitcoin Network Statistics, 
NEIGHBORHOOD POOL WATCH: BITCOIN MINING POOL, NETWORK, AND EXCHANGE ANALYSIS 
(Nov. 7, 2016), http://organofcorti.blogspot.com. In addition to electricity costs, the cost of 
hardware is significant. Since the introduction of Bitcoin, there have been four generations of 
mining devices: Central Processing Units (CPUs), Graphics Processing Units (GPUs), Field 
Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs), and Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs). 
Conversion from one system to another to improve mining outcomes involves an investment 
of $100,000 or more. 
47 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 10,026,082 (issued July 17, 2018); Canadian Patent No. 2,986,563 
(issued Nov. 24, 2016). 
48 As evidenced by FATCA and the common reporting standard, as well as the recent 
developments by the FATF. See discussion supra. 
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elusive taxpayers and transactions.49 As such, they may be the best or 
only hope of governments to join rather than fight the advent of 
cryptocurrency-based transactions, smart contracts, and future uses of 
blockchain based applications.50 
 
Returning to the CryptoKitty example, one could imagine that a tax 
authority could seek to write itself into the Dapper platform, whereby 
it becomes a payee alongside the miners to whom transaction fees are 
paid as CryptoKitty buyers and sellers undertake their transactions, 
including propagation of their assets through breeding. This would in 
effect constitute a software-enabled withholding function: Dapper 
would presumably transfer the tax payment, in ETH, to an account of 
the tax authority in the same manner as it currently transfers gas to 
ETH miners.  
 
Because ETH is not a currency for tax purposes, this would amount to 
a transfer of the taxpayer’s property to the tax authority, which may be 
objectionable because it triggers a gain (thus resulting in additional 
tax) or a loss (which may or may not impact the taxpayer’s income for 
the year). It seems likely that taxpayers would seek to identify tax-
favourable identification of the specific ETH being transferred in order 
to minimize these tax effects, thus complicating the picture. 
 
Beyond this tax issue there are a number of technical difficulties 
involved including that the government would have to accept tax 
payment in ETH. If the tax authority would not accept ETH, it would 
have to establish whose responsibility it would be to pay the 
 
 
 
 
49 Thus, governments are likely to pursue strategies to increase the flow of information 
between financial intermediaries and regulatory authorities on grounds of improving the 
relevant technological infrastructure. See, e.g., Gov’t Office for Sci., FinTech Futures: The 
UK as a World Leader in Financial Technologies, 2015, GS/15/3, at 23 (“Government could 
take the lead by commissioning a ‘digital modernisation strategy’ for and in collaboration with 
the financial services industry, to determine what desirable components make up the UK’s 
critical national financial services technology infrastructure and possible gaps, threats and 
opportunities.”). 
50 The OECD recently reported on using new technologies to improve tax administration, but 
it focuses mainly on big data and does discuss distributed ledger technologies. See OECD, 
Technologies for Better Tax Administration: A Practical Guide for Revenue Bodies (2016), 
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transaction fees involved in converting ETH to fiat currency (and 
whose responsibility it is to deal with currency fluctuations).  
 
It seems likely that these costs would be the taxpayer’s responsibility, 
which may raise additional objections in terms of the impact of the tax 
as well as in terms of achieving horizontal equity among taxpayers. 
Moreover, if the withholding is not a final tax, the taxpayer would 
have to be given information regarding the amount of fiat currency 
effectively paid to the tax authority and there could be issues involved 
in factoring in currency fluctuations in the refund process.51 All of 
these technical details could presumably be worked out, but with 
considerable complexity involved as the number and volume of 
cryptocurrency types and transactions increases.  
 
V. Corner the Market 
 
Finally, hinted at in the OECD’s Interim Report on digital taxation is 
the possibility that governments might seek to capitalize on their 
unique position by creating their own applications of emerging 
technology. To date, the scope of development in taxation applications 
seems to be focused on indirect tax compliance, but it seems inevitable 
that governments will seek to eliminate an unregulated market by 
developing their own blockchain platforms, and then try to get the 
private sector to transact on that instead of elsewhere (whether by 
compulsion or economic incentive).52 
 
In terms of the more straightforward, compliance-oriented approach, 
the OECD’s Interim Report on digital taxation points to tax 
administrations’ potential use of blockchain to increase the “efficiency 
and security of income and transaction reporting.”53 There is scant 
 
 
 
 
51 For example, a taxpayer might object if the payment withheld is not fully refunded due to 
differences in the conversion rate (and perhaps the required transaction fee) at the time of the 
withholding and that of the refund payment. 
52 See, e.g., Kimberly Johnson, What Blockchain Is and What It Can Do, Wall St. J. (June 19, 
2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/what-blockchain-is-and-what-it-can-do-1466388185 
(describing a survey of 800 executives and technology experts at the World Economic Forum 
who predicted (on average) that governments would be using blockchain to collect taxes by 
2023). 
53 OECD, supra note 26, at 206. 
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detail as to how tax administrations would achieve this, however it is 
clear that some governments are experimenting with blockchain 
applications for regulatory purposes, including some for taxation. 
 
For example, China’s Shenzhen Special Economic Zone and 
Guangdong Municipal Tax Bureau are working on blockchain 
applications to implement electronic invoice platforms.54 The 
Shenzhen Municipal Taxation Bureau worked with Chinese tech giant 
Tencent to “successfully connec[t] the blockchain invoice system with 
the WeChat payment platform” (the implications of which are not 
clear), while the Guangdong platform is still under development.55 The 
rationale is that blockchain will improve efficiency and transparency 
of invoice services, because in the view of the tax authority, 
“Blockchain technology has established a highly mutual trust data 
sharing mechanism among tax authorities, invoice service providers, 
taxpayers and other parties.”56 In the same vein, Thailand’s Revenue 
Department is working on a blockchain application to fight VAT 
fraud.57 
 
 
 
 
54 See Max Yakubowski, Guangdong Province to Use Blockchain-Based Electronic Tax 
Invoices for E-Commerce, Cointelegraph, (Feb. 18, 2019) [hereinafter Yakubowski I], 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/china-guangdong-province-to-use-blockchain-based-
electronic-tax-invoices-for-e-commerce [https://perma.cc/H5FT-QWYM]; Max Yakubowski, 
Shenzhen Special Economic Zone to Use Blockchain for Electronic Tax Invoices, 
Cointelegraph (Dec. 12, 2018) [hereinafter Yakubowski II], 
https://cointelegraph.com/news/china-shenzhen-special-economic-zone-to-use-blockchain-for-
electronic-tax-invoices [https://perma.cc/7C6V-SPMW]; see also Blockchain Will Be Used by 
Chinese Government for Taxation and Electronic Invoices Issuance, COINFOX (July 31, 2017), 
,http://www.coinfox.info/novosti/7335-blockchain-will-be-used-by-chinese-government-for-
taxation-and-electronic-invoices-issuance [https://perma.cc/7NGS-GZEE]. 
55 Yakubowski II, supra note 54. 
56 Yakubowski I, supra note 54 
57 Wichit Chantanusornsiri, Blockchain Undergoes Tests for Tracking VAT Payments, 
BANKOK POST, Dec. 3, 2018, 
https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/1586614/blockchain-undergoes-tests-for-
tracking-vat-payments. State use of blockchain for this purpose is advocated by Richard T. 
Ainsworth and Andrew Shact, supra note 4, and has been modeled by Olivier Rikken, 
Blockchain Real Time Tax (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/blockchain-real-
time-tax-olivier-rikken/ [https://perma.cc/KDG7-YTGJ]. In addition, accounting firms are 
exploring the possibilities. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HOW BLOCKCHAIN 
TECHNOLOGY COULD IMPROVE THE TAX SYSTEM (2016), 
https://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/futuretax/assets/documents/how-blockchain-could-improve-the-
tax-system.pdf; Piotr Barański, Blockchain Technology and Its Potential in Taxes, DELOITTE 
(Dec. 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/pl/en/pages/tax/articles/blockchain-technology.html. 
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Beyond tax compliance, however, governments are experimenting 
with market-cornering innovations in other areas involving blockchain, 
which may ultimately lend themselves to the kind of data pools that 
make developing machine learning algorithms very attractive. Current 
efforts may serve as the groundwork for future public control of 
private smart contracts in a way that would allow governments to 
accomplish directly what they would otherwise be looking to 
accomplish through cooperation, as described in the market joining 
approach above.  
 
Venezuela’s adoption of a state cryptocurrency, the petro, serves as an 
example of this approach.58 Other examples include Australia’s 
announcement that it is exploring the use of blockchain in one 
department to “provide secure and transparent international trade and 
supply management through a pan-government framework”59 and in 
another to “achieve better sustainability and traceability” and “meet 
consumer demands of sustainably-sourced products.”60  
 
Blockchain-based supply chain traceability is a significant area of 
development in the private sector and Australia is not the only 
government potentially setting up a platform to rival the private 
sectors’ offerings.61 China also announced in 2019 that it was 
 
 
 
 
58 See, e.g., David Hundeyin, Controversial Venezuelan State Cryptocurrency ‘Petro’ is Now 
for Sale, (Oct. 31, 2018, 7:15 AM), https://www.ccn.com/controversial-venezuelan-state-
cryptocurrency-petro-is-now-for-sale [https://perma.cc/8ST8-FXSJ]; Kevin Helms, Maduro 
Orders Price of Venezuela's 'Cryptocurrency' to More Than Double, Bitcoin.com (Dec. 2, 
2018), https://news.bitcoin.com/maduro-price-venezuelas-cryptocurrency/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z3KT-VYB2] (observing that the petro is not a true cryptocurrency because 
its price is being set by the government; 1 petro is intended to equal the price of one barrel of 
oil). 
59 Sujha Sundarajan, Australian Government Loots to Blockchain for Trade Modernization, 
COINDESK (May 10, 2018, 10:05 AM), https://www.coindesk.com/australian-government-airs-
blockchain-plan-for-trade-modernization/ [https://perma.cc/RJ3H-FT9J]. 
60 Lester Wan, Sustainable Sugar: Australia to Employ Blockchain to Boost Provenance and 
Profitability, FOODNAVIGATOR-ASIA.COM, (July 31, 2018, 2:09 PM), 
https://www.foodnavigator-asia.com/Article/2018/07/31/Sustainable-sugar-Australia-to-
employ-blockchain-to-boost-provenance-and-profitability [https://perma.cc/53WQ-3U7R]. 
61 Supply chain management is a key area of blockchain research, including but not limited to 
companies focused on fair trade and sustainability. See e.g., Ian Allison, IBM’s Food 
Blockchain is Going Live with a Supermarket Giant on Board, COINDESK, (Oct. 8, 2018, 11:30 
AM), https://www.coindesk.com/ibm-food-supply-chain-blockchain-carrefour-live-
production; Miceal Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks 
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developing a blockchain-based system to “strengthen supervision of 
food and drug quality assurance with better traceability and anti-
counterfeiting measures.”62 Similarly, the United Nations announced 
that it would introduce a blockchain-based system to monitor the 
movement of food from Djibouti’s port (receipt of shipment) to 
Ethiopia (location of UN food operations) in an effort to manage its 
humanitarian food relief efforts, which are susceptible to misuse in 
war-torn destinations.63 
 
Blockchain-based supply chains would provide governments with a 
vast amount of information that could be valuable for all sorts of 
regulatory purposes. In the tax scenario, to the extent that governments 
can develop viable blockchain platforms that provide a valuable 
service to businesses and consumers without charge, they potentially 
draw in more parties and private transactions which ultimately allow 
them to start collecting information leading to tax enforcement.  
 
Returning to the CryptoKitty example, the idea would be that a 
government would seek to provide a platform to replace either 
Simplex or Dapper (or both), bypassing financial institutions and 
setting up a streamlined fiat-to-crypto exchange application and then 
enlisting the CryptoKitty development team to incorporate its software 
into their application.64 The obvious advantage to such an approach is 
 
Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/business/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html 
[https://perma.cc/NH22-8PZD]; Kim S. Nash, Walmark-Led Blockchain Effort Seeks Farm to 
Grocery Aisle View of Food Supply, WALL ST. JOURNAL: CIO JOURNAL (June 25, 2018, 1:05 
PM) https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/06/25/walmart-led-blockchain-effort-seeks-farm-to-
grocery-aisle-view-of-food-supply-chain/ [https://perma.cc/3DYC-LW4P] (explaining that the 
IBM Food Trust, designed to trace food recalls within minutes of detected problems); Helen 
Partz, US Seafood Giant Bumble Bee Foods to Use SAP Blockchain Tech in Supply Chain, 
COINTELEGRAPH, (March 8, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/north-american-seafood-
firm-to-use-blockchain-tech-in-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/U3JY-R7DY]. 
62 Adrian Zmudzinski, Chinese District Food and Drug Administration to Use Blockchain for 
Quality Assurance, Cointelegraph (Feb. 1, 2019), https://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-
district-food-and-drug-administration-to-use-blockchain-for-quality-assurance 
[https://perma.cc/YEC4-FMZ6]. 
63 See Anna Baydakova, UN Food Program to Expand Blockchain Testing to African Supply 
Chain, COINDESK (Sept. 26, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/un-food-program-
to-expand-blockchain-testing-to-african-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/8LEH-AKU5]. 
64 Identifying and negotiating with virtual asset providers would be cumbersome. Whether a 
government might instead require virtual asset providers to use its platform is debatable. 
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that the government that successfully created such a platform would 
control all the relevant transactions and no additional reporting or 
withholding by third parties would be required. The disadvantage 
would be that other tax authorities would still have to rely on 
international cooperation in order to get the information they require 
for their own compliance efforts.  
 
Current state-based smart contract applications are still nascent and it 
is not clear where they may lead in terms of tax enforcement. In any 
case, broader social control is likely to be the main consequence, if not 
the primary object, of these efforts. The extent to which individuals 
will voluntarily embrace such systems and accept the regulatory 
consequences thereof—whether tax related or otherwise—is yet to be 
determined. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Smart contracts, like blockchain technology itself, are a work in 
progress. It might be too early to undertake a useful analysis of the 
normative implications of government use of these technologies to 
either fight, join, or try to dominate the market for virtual assets in 
direct competition with the ambitions of private law orders. A 
cautious, responsive approach using the familiar methods of third party 
withholding and reporting seems most likely to be the one that OECD 
countries will take, especially given recent developments in the 
international regulation of financial intermediaries through the 
Financial Action Task Force. But some states might invest in 
becoming technological first movers in order to gain more control over 
virtual asset activities and innovations. 
 
Accordingly, albeit for different reasons, there is little reason to 
anticipate that tax authorities will successfully implement tax 
administration goals through smart contract systems. There are still 
ample ways for governments to effectuate automated digital transfers 
where the parties to transactions, the transactions, or the platforms are 
subject to their physical control.  
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Short of web censorship (which is likely to fail in practice even if it 
could bypass legal barriers), to date there is little evidence that 
governments will be able to use any form of technology to gain full 
control over virtual assets, virtual platforms, or decentralized 
networks. There is similarly little reason to believe that any 
government will develop a rival platform to attract private sector 
transactions away from unregulated alternatives. Instead, the most 
likely scenario is the road taken to date, which is to narrowly address 
the worst tax system abuses with familiar safeguards to the best ability 
of the tax administrator, subject to resource constraints as well as legal 
barriers. This is a quixotic fight to be sure, but it will be fought until 
some other political equilibrium emerges. 
 
